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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, Illinois courts decided issues in tort law
ranging from the constitutionality of the medical malpractice affidavit requirement' and Chicago Transit Authority special immunity 2 to the permissibility of a wrongful death action on behalf of
an aborted fetus. 3 The courts rejected attempts to discount to present value damages for pain, suffering, disability and disfigurement. 4
The courts, however, upheld every exculpatory agreement encountered.' In addition, the supreme court opened a new channel to
landlord liability for the criminal acts of third parties.6
II.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Duty
Throughout the Survey period, Illinois courts examined the extent of duty owed by landlords, railroads and highway designers.
In these cases, the courts ruled that the duties owed, if any, were
limited.
In Rowe v. State Bank,7 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
owner and managing agent of an office complex had a duty to take
reasonable precautions to prevent unauthorized access when the
owner-agent had knowledge of outstanding and unaccounted-for
passkeys. s The case arose when two women were attacked and
1. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 184 111. App. 3d 802, 540 N.E.2d 847 (1st Dist.),
appeal allowed, 127 Ill. 2d 614, 545 N.E.2d 107 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2622(a)(1) (1987). See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
2. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 125 Ill. 2d 230, 531 N.E.2d 1 (1988). See infra
notes 269-81 and accompanying text.
3. Light v. Proctor Community Hosp., 182 Ill. App. 3d 563, 538 N.E.2d 828 (3d
Dist. 1989), appealdenied, 127 Ill. 2d 619, 545 N.E.2d 113 (1989). See infra notes 106-16
and accompanying text.
4. Schaffner v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 129 Ill. 2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643 (1989).
See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
5. Moran v. Lala, 179 Ill. App. 3d 771, 534 N.E.2d 1319 (2d Dist. 1989); Falkner v.
Hinckley Parachute Center, 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 533 N.E.2d 941 (2d Dist. 1989); Koch
v. Spalding, 174 Il1. App. 3d 692, 529 N.E.2d 19 (5th Dist. 1988). See infra notes 222-38
and accompanying text.
6. Rowe v. State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988). See infra notes 7-18
and accompanying text.
7. 125 Ill. 2d at 203, 531 N.E.2d at 1358.
8. Id. at 221-22, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
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shot while working late. 9 One of the women died. The assailant
had worked previously at the complex and possessed master keys.10
The survivor of the attack and the husband of the dead woman
alleged that the office park in which the women worked had assumed a duty to protect office occupants from criminal and tortious attacks by intruders." The complaint charged defendants
with a breach of this duty by, inter alia, failing properly to maintain locks, control the distribution of master keys, warn of numerous reported criminal incidents and otherwise provide adequate
security.' 2
The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that a landlord owed a
general duty to protect tenants.' 3 The court recognized that liability may exist when the landlord voluntarily provides security measures in a negligent manner and such negligence is the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.' 4 Plaintiffs, however, failed to show
that defendants had taken security measures on behalf of
plaintiffs. IThe court found persuasive plaintiffs' argument that the landlord, by manufacturing master keys and retaining access to the individual office units, assumed a duty to take reasonable precautions
to prevent unauthorized entries by individuals possessing those
keys. 16 The court held that because defendants had knowledge of
the unaccounted-for keys, they breached a duty to warn or take
reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable unauthorized entries.'" The court stated that changing the locks, or at least warning the tenants, would not have been an unreasonable burden for
9. Id.. at 207, 531 N.E.2d at 1360.
10. Id. at 208, 211, 531 N.E.2d at 1360-61.
11. Id. at 209, 531 N.E.2d at 1361.
12. Id. The circuit court consolidated the actions, granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants, and authorized appeal. Id. at 207, 531 N.E.2d at 1360. The appellate court affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. Id. at 207-08,
531 N.E.2d at 1360.
13. Id. at 216, 531 N.E.2d at 1364 (citing Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 89 Ill. 2d
122, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982) and Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 111. 2d 204, 399
N.E.2d 596 (1979)).
14. 125 Ill. App. 2d at 217, 531 N.E.2d at 1365.
15. Id. at 218, 531 N.E.2d at 1365.
16. Id. at 221, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
17. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1368. The court rejected defendants' contention that
the third-party criminal acts constituted an independent intervening cause that insulated
them from liability. The record proximately connected the landlord's failure to take precautions with the criminal entry. Id. at 226, 531 N.E.2d at 1369. The court stated that
seventeen incidents of criminal activity as well as a police officer's warning to change the
locks had not moved the landlord to act. Id.
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the landlord to assume.18
Although courts generally will not hold a landlord liable for injuries on his premises caused by a third party's criminal act, courts
will create an exception when the landlord acts in such a way to
make the criminal conduct foreseeable. Following Rowe, if a plaintiff can plead facts sufficient to show that the danger was probable
and predictable, the complaint should survive a motion for summary judgment.
In Dunn v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,' 9 a motorcyclist was killed
when he drove into the side of a train stopped at a crossing. 20 The
decedent's survivors alleged negligence and wilful and wanton conduct on the part of defendant railroad. Plaintiff claimed that the
decedent was unable to see the parked train until it was too late to
avoid hitting it. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's third amended
complaint with prejudice, which the appellate court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. 2'
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the estate's claim for negligence failed to state a cause of action. 22 The court began its analysis by stating the longstanding rule that a train stopped at a
crossing is adequate warning of its presence to any traveler who
exercises ordinary care for his own safety.23 The court further
stated that the railroad has no duty to give additional signs, signals
or warnings. 24 The court recognized a "special circumstance" exception to the rule, but it stated that darkness, heavy fog, and poor
visibility did not fall into the exception. 25 The court concluded
that plaintiffs failed to allege the existence of a special
18. Id. at 228, 531 N.E.2d at 1370. The only other significant developments in landlord liability during the Survey period were variations on the well-worn "natural accumulation" rule that restricts recovery in slip, trip and fall personal injury practice. In Weber
v. Chen Enters, 184 Ill. App. 3d 847, 540 N.E.2d 957 (1st Dist.), appealdenied sub. nom.
Gribben v. Chen Enters., 127 Ill. 2d 643, 545 N.E.2d 110 (1989), the court held a complaint for a fall on a natural accumulation of ice not subject to summary judgment when
inadequate lighting was alleged as a proximate cause of the fall. The natural accumulation rule, however, was held to apply to water tracked in a store by customers. Handy v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 182 Ill. App. 3d 969, 538 N.E.2d 846 (1st Dist. 1989).
19. 127 Ill.
2d 350, 362-63, 537 N.E.2d 738, 739 (1989).
20. Id. at 362-63, 537 N.E.2d at 739.
21. Id. at 354, 537 N.E.2d at 739.
22. Id. at 366, 537 N.E.2d at 745.
23. Id. at 357, 537 N.E.2d at 741.
24. Id. (citing Langston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 398 Ill. 248, 75 N.E.2d 363 (1947)
and Petricek v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 21 Ill. App. 2d 60, 65, 157 N.E.2d 421, 423 (1st Dist.
1959)).
25. 127 I11.2d at 357, 537 N.E.2d at 741. A blinding snowstorm would fall into the
exception. Bachman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 132 Ill. App. 2d 277, 268 N.E.2d 42 (4th Dist.
1971).
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circumstance. 26
The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the longstanding rule is inconsistent with the doctrine of pure comparative negligence.27 The court ruled instead that the decedent's conduct was
negligent and that the railroad could not be expected to anticipate
and guard against a negligent motorist hitting a standing train.28
Declining to place this burden on railroads, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 29
Similarly, in Robinson v. Suitery, Ltd.,3° the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District held no cause of action exists for the
negligent disposal of garbage.31 Plaintiff sustained nerve damage
when she speared her hand on glass as she attempted to dispose of
a trash bag in a large commercial dumpster behind a mini-mall.
The defendant's employee had shattered several long fluorescent
tubes by slamming the dumpster lid on them. The trial court
granted summary judgment to defendant on the ground that it
owed no duty in connection with the disposal of waste materials,
and the appellate court affirmed.32
The court recognized some merit in plaintiff's contentions but
was not persuaded to create a duty based on negligent disposal.33
Plaintiff's claim was undermined because the glass was in or on top
of the dumpster and visible.34 According to the court, it was not
legally foreseeable that glass in the garbage might hurt someone.
Fearing that its holding could result in the absurd requirement that
every piece of glass thrown away must be wrapped, the court held
that the law does not require extraordinary care in waste disposal.35 The court carefully distinguished situations involving the
disposal of substances such as hazardous waste.36
In Keene v. Bierman,37 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth
26. 127 Il1.2d at 360, 537 N.E.2d at 742.
27. Id. at 358, 364-67, 537 N.E.2d at 741, 744 (citing Alvis v. Ribar, 85 111. 2d 1, 421
N.E 2d 886 (1981)). The court applied the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. Id.
The modified form of comparative negligence became effective in 1986, after the accident
in this case. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1987).
28. 127 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 537 N.E.2d at 744-45.
29. Id. at 366-67, 373, 537 N.E.2d at 745, 748.
30. 172 Ill. App. 3d 359, 526 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 1989).
31. Id. at 362, 526 N.E.2d at 568.
32. Id. at 364, 526 N.E.2d at 569.
33. Id. at 362, 526 N.E.2d at 568.
34. Id. at 363, 526 N.E.2d at 568.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 364, 526 N.E.2d at 569.
37. 184 Ill. App. 3d 87, 540 N.E.2d 16 (5th Dist. 1989).
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District held that the doctrine of public official immunity shielded
a state highway engineer from any professional duty to a highway
user.3 8 The case arose when plaintiff sustained severe and permanent brain damage from a car accident.39 Plaintiff settled with the
car driver and proceeded with a claim against defendant engineer
who designed the road while in the employ of the Illinois Department of Conservation. The trial court granted the state's motion
on behalf of
defendant to dismiss on grounds of public official
immunity.?°
On appeal, plaintiff argued that mere state employment did not
insulate the engineer from liability for his acts. Plaintiff contended
that defendant, as a registered professional engineer, had an obligation to meet the profession's standard of care. The court rejected
plaintiff's argument ruling that, absent a special relationship between plaintiff and defendant, defendant's only duty was to the
public generally.4 '
These cases reveal the courts' reluctance, in the absence of special circumstances, to approve new causes of action. Rowe v. State
Bank creates a narrow exception to the long-held belief that a landlord has no duty to a tenant to protect against the criminal acts of
third parties beyond the landlord's control.
B.

Causation

During the Survey period, the Illinois appellate courts decided
several traffic-related cases involving the question of causation. In
Hamilton v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,42 the appellate
court affirmed summary judgment for defendant.43 Even though
the crossing gate was down for seven minutes without a train in
sight, the court found the driver's failure to look and listen the
proximate cause of the accident, not the position of the gate.'
In Getman v. Indiana HarborBelt R.R., the court ruled that
even a frequent malfunction of railroad warning signals did not
cause a collision. Plaintiff had argued that the frequent malfunctions gave him a false sense of security, thus relieving him of his
38. Id. at 89, 540 N.E.2d at 17.
39. Id. at 88, 540 N.E.2d at 16. The car driver swerved to avoid an animal and hit a
tree three feet from the roadway. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 89, 540 N.E.2d at 17.
42. 175 11. App. 3d 758, 530 N.E.2d 268 (3d Dist. 1988).
43. Id. at 759-60, 530 N.E.2d at 269.
44. Id. at 761-62, 530 N.E.2d at 270.
45. 172 Il1. App. 3d 297, 526 N.E.2d 557 (1st Dist. 1988).
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duty to use ordinary care. The court rejected this argument and
ruled that plaintiff should have exercised ordinary care because his
knowledge of the malfunction put him on notice that the signals
were not reliable." The court affirmed the judgment dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.4"
At issue in Novander v. City of Morris,48 was whether potholes
had caused a traffic accident. Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle was struck by a truck that swerved into plaintiff's lane to
avoid several large potholes.49 Plaintiff settled with the truck
driver, but he proceeded against the city and others on the theory
that it was foreseeable that a driver might alter the path of his
vehicle to avoid large potholes.5 0 The trial court dismissed these
counts and plaintiff appealed.5 The appellate court held that the
potholes, at most, furnished a condition by which plaintiff's injuries were made possible. 2 Consequently, the court refused to hold
the city liable for the remote risk that the defendant, to avoid a
pothole, would drive into oncoming traffic;
therefore, it affirmed
5 3
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
Two related cases decided during the Survey period are also of
interest. In Mason v. City of Chicago,54 plaintiff tripped in a hole
outside a crosswalk. The court failed to find the city liable because
plaintiff had used a public street as a walkway. Similarly, in
Householder v. City of Bunker Hill,55 the court held that the city
did not have a duty to a plaintiff who fell in a manhole while pushing a car in the street; the city's liability was limited to use of
streets as streets, not walkways.
Apparently, during the Survey year, courts have recognized that
a condition may be relevant to an injury without constituting the
cause of the injury. The railroad crossing case is noteworthy because for years, the question of the safety at a crossing and the due
care of the motorist have been for the jury to decide. 6
46. Id. at 299, 526 N.E.2d at 558.
47. Id. at 303, 526 N.E.2d at 561.
48. 181 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 537 N.E.2d 1146 (3d Dist. 1989).
49. d.at 1077-78, 537 N.E.2d at 1147.
50. Id. at 1078, 537 N.E.2d at 1147.
51, Id. at 1077, 537 N.E.2d at 1147.
52. Id. at 1078-80, 537 N.E.2d at 1147-48.
53. Id. at 1080, 537 N.E.2d at 1149.
54. 173 Ill. App. 3d 330, 527 N.E.2d 572 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 123 Il1. 2d 559,
535 N.E.2d 403 (1988).
55. 172 I1. App. 3d 1037, 527 N.E.2d 528 (4th Dist. 1988).
56. See J. MIRZA AND L. APPLEMAN, § 5:2 ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND PRACTICE
138-39 (1973).
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III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Affidavit Requirement Struck Down

The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, in DeLuna v.
St. Elizabeth's Hospital,57 held that the statutory requirement for a
health care professional's certificate of merit on a medical malpractice claim was an invalid delegation of judicial power. That statute
provided that in any medical malpractice action, plaintiff must attach to the complaint an affidavit stating that a health professional
had determined there to be a "reasonable and meritorious" cause
for filing the action. 58 Plaintiff brought a professional negligence
action for damages against defendants but failed to attach the requisite declarations.59 The trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss with prejudice.'
On the basis that the legislature overstepped the bounds of constitutional authority, the appellate court held the affidavit requirement unconstitutional.6" Upholding this statute would have meant
that members of a private professional group could hold the keys
to the courthouse. This result would have been intolerable because
physicians are untrained in the law, not appointed through judicial
selection methods, not subject to judicial supervisory authority,
and not bound by precedent. Health care professionals could have
stonewalled the entire malpractice process.62
B.

Referring Physician'sLiability

In Reed v. Bascon,63 the Illinois Supreme Court held that summary judgment was appropriate in favor of a referring or attending
57. 184 Ill. App. 3d 802, 540 N.E.2d 847 (1st Dist.), appeal allowed, 127 I11.2d 614,
545 N.E.2d 107 (1989). DeLuna is discussed at length in Jacobs and Duban, Civil Procedure, 21 Loy. CHI. L.J. 241, 268 (1990).
58. 184 I11.App. 3d at 803, 540 N.E.2d at 848 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-622 (1985)).
59. Id.
60. Id. Plaintiff's appeal was stayed pending the decision of the same issue in a
supreme court case. McCastle v. Sheinkop, 121 I11. 2d 188, 520 N.E.2d 293 (1987).
When McCastle was decided on different grounds, an appeal went forward. DeLuna, 184
I11.App. 3d. at 803, 540 N.E.2d at 848.
61. Id. at 810, 540 N.E.2d at 852. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 127 I11. 2d 614, 545 N.E.2d 107 (1989). As of
publication, the decision is pending.
62. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 810, 540 N.E.2d at 852. The appellate court cited for authority Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). In Ybarra, the court held
that the refusal to testify by anyone present at an operation gone wrong mandated the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, under Ybarra every professional in attendance is
potentially liable.
63. 124 Ill. 2d 386, 530 N.E.2d 417 (1988).
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physician when nothing demonstrated agency, concert of action, or
negligence in that physician's referral." In Reed, plaintiff sought
defendant Bascon's care for rectal pain and bleeding. 5 Bascon, a
general practitioner, referred plaintiff to Dr. Botuyan, a board-certified surgeon. Dr. Botuyan performed an operation using an outmoded technique. Complications arose and plaintiff sued the
surgeon, the hospital, and Dr. Bascon.66 Dr. Bascon, however,
had not been present at the operation. The trial court granted Bascon's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that an attending physician could not be strictly or vicariously liable for the
surgical procedures of a specialist.6" There had been no allegation
or proof of negligence by Dr. Bascon. 6' The appellate court reversed and found that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning Bascon's control, concerted action and negligent referral. 69
The supreme court found negligence only in Dr. Botuyan's surgery and affirmed the trial court's grant of Bascon's motion for
summary judgment.70 The court held that allegations of the surgeon's outmoded procedure were insufficient to create an issue of
negligent referral. 71 The court thus ruled that negligent referral
cannot be found unless some control over the course of treatment,
agency or concert of action, or negligence in the referral is present
in the case.72 Plaintiff's pleadings, affidavits and depositions failed
to reveal any of these prerequisites to negligent referral. 73 Furthermore, a conclusion of concerted action was not warranted because
Dr. Bascon merely continued to see the hospitalized plaintiff and
74
to charge for those visits.
Because of the increased use of specialists to perform specific
64. Id. at 395, 530 N.E.2d at 421.
65. Id. at 388, 530 N.E.2d at 418.
66. Id. at 389, 530 N.E.2d at 418.
67. Id. Defendant relied on Beckwith v. Boynton, 235 Ill. App. 469 (1924), to support the proposition that an attending physician can be held vicariously or jointly liable
for a surgeon's malpractice. Beckwith involved a malpractice action against several physicians because of an alleged injury to the plaintiff's vertebrae during a tonsillectomy.
The appellate court held that, absent a question of partnership or of employment between
the various defendants, and without any joint act of negligence committed, the family
physician, who received no fee for the operation but merely called up the surgeons and
arranged the hospital date, could not be held jointly liable. Id. at 485-86.
68. 124 Ill. 2d at 390, 530 N.E.2d at 418.
69. Id. at 390, 530 N.E.2d at 419.
70. Id. at 393, 530 N.E.2d at 420.
71. Id. at 394-95, 530 N.E.2d at 420-421. Plaintiff had waived the agency issue on
appeal. Id.
72. Id. at 395-96, 530 N.E.2d at 421.
73. Id. at 396, 530 N.E.2d at 421.
74. Id. at 400, 530 N.E.2d at 423.
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medical procedures Reed is significant. The case demonstrates
that although a physician may be liable for negligent acts that occur under his supervision or direction, the physician cannot be held
liable for acts committed by a physician to whom the patient is
referred.
C. Good Samaritan Statute"
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District applied the
"Good Samaritan Statute," in Johnson v. Matviuw, 76 to protect a
staff physician from liability for treating a pregnant woman. In
Johnson, the decedent suffered cardiac arrest caused by a pulmonary embolism.77 She had been hospitalized several days earlier by
her physician, Dr. Han, on complaints of numbness and pain in
her leg, hyperventilation and chest pain. When the decedent
lapsed into cardiac arrest, nurses summoned defendant Dr.
Matviuw, who was attending to one of his patients down the hall.
Dr. Matviuw attempted resuscitation for seventeen minutes, at
which time Dr. Han arrived and took over. Dr. Han worked on
the decedent for thirty minutes but to no avail.
Decedent's husband sued both doctors under a negligence theory
for failure to take steps necessary to preserve the life of the fetus.78
Dr. Matviuw filed a summary judgment motion asserting no liability under the protection of the Good Samaritan Statute. He argued
that there was no issue of material fact because no expert testimony
or evidence of negligence had been presented by plaintiff.79 The
trial court granted the doctor's motion. 0
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the statute was inapplicable because defendant had a preexisting duty as a staff member to render
medical care to decedent. 8 ' Plaintiff further argued that defendant's services were billed by the hospital, and the Act applies only
to emergencies outside the hospital.8 2 The appellate court found
no preexisting duty because staff members in that hospital apparently were not required, but merely permitted, to respond to emer75. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111, para. 4400-30 (1987). The statute exempts from civil
liability a health care professional who renders emergency care without regard to
payment.
76. 176 Ill. App. 3d 907, 531 N.E.2d 970 (lst Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 125 Ill. 2d
566, 537 N.E.2d 810 (1989).
77. Id. at 910-11, 531 N.E.2d at 972.
78. Id. at 911, 531 N.E.2d at 972.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 911-12, 531 N.E.2d at 972-973.
81. Id. at 916, 531 N.E.2d at 976.
82. Id.
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gency calls.8 3 The hospital bill in question was found to be merely
for supplies and drugs used during the emergency, not for defendant's professional services, which might have implied a higher
duty."4 The court found nothing in the statutory language to indicate that this emergency within a hospital was excluded from protection. 5 The court held that the Good Samaritan protection
applies to emergencies occurring in a hospital provided the stat6
ute's conditions are met.
D.

Duty to Observers

The appellate court in O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital" recognized a cause of action for injuries a mother sustained from faint8
ing at the sight of a surgical procedure on her injured son.
Plaintiff claimed the hospital acted negligently because it allowed
her to remain in the emergency room during her son's treatment.8 9
The trial court found that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff
and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.9 0
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment, concluding
that there was a genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff's
presence during the procedure was in accord with hospital policy. 9'
Plaintiff fainted when she observed the doctor pierce her son's face
with a suturing needle at the moment she was responding to the
same doctor's instructions to wipe her son's mouth. 92 The court
held that such facts created a question of duty.9 3
83. Id. at 917, 531 N.E.2d at 976.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 918, 531 N.E.2d at 977.
87. 185 I11.App. 3d 694, 542 N.E.2d 11 (1st Dist.), appeal granted, 545 N.E.2d 115
(1989).
88. Id. at 699-700, 542 N.E.2d at 14. The child was hit in the face by a golf club. Id.
at 696, 542 N.E.2d at 12.
89. Id. at 696, 542 N.E.2d at 12. Plaintiff also alleged that the hospital so understaffed its emergency room that the defendant asked plaintiff to wipe Novocaine dripping
from her son's mouth when the child's skull was being stitched. Id. at 696-97, 542
N.E.2d at 12.
90. Id. at 698-99, 542 N.E.2d at 13.
91. Id. at 699, 542 N.E.2d at 14.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 699-700, 542 N.E.2d at 14. The court further ruled that a dispute existed as
to whether the hospital, as a landowner, was required to warn plaintiff, as an invitee, of
an "open and obvious danger." The leading case discussing the "open and obvious danger" standard is Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
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FETAL TORTS

A. Fetal Recovery From Mother
Despite the erosion of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in
many states, 94 Illinois has barred actions in tort by a child against
its parent. During the Survey year, practitioners focused much attention on Stallman v. Youngquist,95 a case in which the Illinois
Supreme Court revisited this issue.
In Stallman, a child, by her father and next friend, sued her
mother for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. 96 The
trial court granted summary judgment for defendant and appeals
followed. 9 In the supreme court, there were two issues: whether
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in Illinois was still viable
and whether a child could recover from a parent for unintended
prenatal injuries. The court decided only the latter issue, holding
that a child subsequently born had no cause of action against its
mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries. 9
The court rejected the belief that a woman should subordinate
her right to control her life when she becomes pregnant. Such a
view would be unacceptable in this state99 because it would infringe
the mother's right to privacy and bodily autonomy." Furthermore, the legal duty to guarantee the mental and physical health of
94. See Annotation, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981); Annotation, 41 A.L.R. 3d 904, 964
(1972). The best-known case abrogating the parent-child tort immunity doctrine is
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), in
which the court held that an injured parent could sue her son for injuring her in a car
accident.
95. 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
96. Id. at 268, 531 N.E.2d at 355. The mother was five months pregnant at the time
of the accident. Id.
97. Id. The case appeared before the circuit court and the appellate court twice. In
the first appellate court opinion, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine was not applied
to the case on the ground that the right of the child to be compensated outweighed public
policy considerations against the cause of action. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App.
3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1st Dist. 1984) (Stallman 1). On remand, the circuit court
granted summary judgment. On a second appeal, the appellate court again reversed and
remanded, ordering a trial on the merits. Staliman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683,
504 N.E.2d 920 (1st Dist. 1987) (Stallman II). Defendant then appealed to the supreme
court.
98. 125 Ill. 2d at 268, 531 N.E.2d at 355. The supreme court found it unnecessary to
reach the issue of the parental immunity doctrine. Id. at 271, 531 N.E.2d at 356. Regardless, subsequent cases have used Stallman as authority that parental tort immunity
remains the law in Illinois. See, e.g., Setinc v. Masny, 185 Ill. App. 3d 15, 19, 540 N.E.2d
937, 940 (3d Dist. 1989) (common law parental immunity barred causes of action against
a father whose son was killed by exploding model airplane fuel stored in garage.)
99. 125 Ill. 2d at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
100. Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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another has never been recognized in the law, and to do so in this
situation would make mother and child "legal adversaries from the
moment of conception until birth." 10 1
Although the court declined to clarify its position with regard to
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, its rationale for rejecting a
new tort was clear. Duties carry with them judicial scrutiny; the
court could not discern an objective standard by which a jury
could determine whether a pregnant woman did all that was necessary to fulfill her duty.1"2 The court feared that prejudicial and
stereotypical views concerning women's reproductive abilities
would interfere with a jury's determination." 3 In addition, the
court identified many problems inherent in creating such a cause of
action."° Such far-reaching public policy issues, coupled with the
unprecedented intrusion into mothers' autonomy, impelled the
court to hold that if pregnant women are to owe a legal duty to
their fetuses, the legislature will have to create the duty after thorough study, investigation, and debate. 10 5
B. Wrongful Death of Aborted Fetus
In Light v. ProctorCommunity Hospital, °0 plaintiff underwent a
thyroid scan, during the course of which she learned that she was
pregnant.10 7 Consequently, on her physician's advice, she terminated the pregnancy."0 8 Plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence in
the doctor's failure to warn her not to undergo the scan if she were
pregnant."°9 Plaintiff amended the complaint premising the action
upon the fetus' wrongful death." 0 The trial court subsequently
granted defendants' motions to dismiss the wrongful death
counts. II
On appeal, plaintiff argued that defendants' negligent conduct
proximately caused her fetus' death because her decision to abort it
101. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
102. Id. at 277-78, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
103. Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
104. The court was conerned with, for example, whether the standard of care should
vary according to whether the pregnancy was planned or unplanned, whether the standard varies with socio-economic condition, and whether injuries occurring before knowledge of pregnancy would be actionable. Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
105. Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
106. 182 Ill. App. 3d 563, 538 N.E.2d 828 (3d. Dist.), appeal denied, 127 I1.2d 619,
545 N.E.2d 113 (1989).
107. Id.at 564-66, 538 N.E.2d at 829-30.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 565, 538 N.E.2d at 829.
110. Id.
111. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

was a foreseeable result of defendants' conduct.1 2 A provision in
the Wrongful Death Act prohibits a cause of action for death
caused by an abortion.II 3 Plaintiff argued that the provision did
not apply to her case because it was intended to protect only those
who performed abortions, not those whose negligent acts caused an
abortion to be performed.' 14 The court rejected plaintiff's theory,
reasoning that there could be no action under the Act because the
fetus was not aborted during the scanning procedure, rather it terminated as a result of a subsequent consensual and legal abortion. 115 The court held that the statutory language was
unambiguous and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the wrong116
ful death counts.

V.

A.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Scheming to Defraud

Since the Illinois Supreme Court's Knierim v. Izzo ". decision,

which recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court has continuously applied the following objective
standard: would the conduct cause emotional distress to a reason8
able person under the same circumstances?"
In McGrath v. Fahey,' 19 the supreme court upheld a cardiac patient's cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional dis20
tress against financiers who allegedly schemed to defraud him. 1

Plaintiff contended that a bank schemed to pressure him into surrendering his interest in certain mortgages by wrongfully refusing
to renew unrelated certificates of deposit worth over one million
dollars.' 2 ' While disputing the bank's refusal to renew the certificates of deposit, plaintiff suffered a massive heart attack that necessitated open-heart surgery. Aware of plaintiff's condition, the
112. Id.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2 (1987).
114. 182 Il1. App. 3d at 565, 538 N.E.2d at 829.
115. Id. at 566, 538 N.E.2d at 830.
116. Id.
117. 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
118. The court applies three factors to determine whether the tort has been committed. First, the conduct must be extreme. Second, the perpetrator must intend severe
emotional distress, or know that there is a high probability it will result. Finally, the
emotional distress that the conduct causes must be so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it. See Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d
765 (1976).
119. 126 Ill. 2d 78, 533 N.E.2d 806 (1988).
120. Id. at 93, 533 N.E.2d at 812.
121. Id. at 81-83, 533 N.E.2d at 807-08.
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bank continued to dishonor drafts on plaintiff's accounts and made
persistent phone calls to plaintiff at his home. The bank knowingly
placed additional stress upon22plaintiff, by suing him and making a
set-off against his accounts. 1
The court explained that the degree of power the wrongdoer
possesses over an individual underscores the action's outrageousness. 123 A defendant's awareness of plaintiff's susceptibility also
pertains to whether the conduct is outrageous. 124 Because extortion was at the heart of defendant's action, and because this conduct continued with knowledge of plaintiff's disease, the court
concluded that a jury could reasonably find defendant's conduct
outrageous and intentional.
One may discern from McGrath that a court will be more likely
to pronounce certain conduct outrageous if defendant's control
over plaintiff is combined with plaintiff's vulnerability or susceptibility. The McGrath facts were particularly egregious. Defendants, without any legal justification, used a freeze on the unrelated
certificate of deposit funds to coerce plaintiff into releasing mortgages that were plaintiff's only means of recovering some payment
for realty he had surrendered. Defendant threatened to tie up the
25
plaintiff's funds for five years and to ruin his medical practice.
B.

Following and Harassing

The Illinoid Appellate Court for the Third District held in Van
Duyn v. Smith 126 that harassing an abortion clinic director created
sufficient grounds for a complaint of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 27 Over a two-year period, defendant followed
plaintiff, picketed plaintiff's home, interfered with plaintiff's ingress and egress from the airport, confronted plaintiff numerous
times, and distributed a "Wanted Poster" with plaintiff's face on
it. 28 Plaintiff filed her complaint on the basis of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, libel/negligence, libel/malice, and
invasion of privacy.' 29 The trial court dismissed the complaint for
122. Id. at 85-86, 533 N.E.2d at 809.
123. Id. at 86-87, 533 N.E.2d at 809-10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 comment e, at 74 (1965)).
124. Id. at 90, 533 N.E.2d at 811.
125. Id. at 91-92, 533 N.E.2d at 812.
126. 173 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (3d Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 124 Ill. 2d
562, 535 N.E.2d 922 (1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3217 (1989).
127. Id. at 534, 527 N.E.2d at 1011-12.
128. Id. at 526, 527 N.E.2d at 1007.
129. Id. at 526, 527 N.E.2d at 1006.
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failure to state a cause of action and plaintiff appealed.1 30 Finding
defendant's behavior "beyond the bounds of decency,"'' 31 the appellate court held that a jury could find defendant's conduct
suffi132
action.
further
for
remanded
and
outrageous,
ciently
VI.

PRIVACY TORTS

In Mucklow v. John MarshallLaw School, 133 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that a law professor's interception of a student's confidential record did not support the tort
of invasion of privacy.134 Plaintiff claimed that his professor obtained the student's critical evaluation of him and, through handwriting analysis, identified plaintiff and retaliated by giving him a
"D" grade. 3 5 The student filed suit alleging in part an invasion of
privacy. 136 The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings and
37
sanctions in defendants' favor.1
The student argued, on appeal, that defendant law school acted
in bad faith and in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 38 The
court ruled that no precedent existed to support a finding of liability for a school's "mistreatment" of dispensing an unsatisfactory
grade. 39 Furthermore, the court stated that to establish a count
for invasion of privacy, plaintiff must show an unauthorized intrusion into a private matter which causes anguish and suffering and
that a reasonable person would consider offensive.1 The court
found that the professor was authorized to look at the records and
that any distress suffered by the student was not severe enough to
.warrant recovery.' 4'
130. Id.
131. Id. at 534, 527 N.E.2d at 1012. That the plaintiff required hospital treatment for
her emotional well-being bolstered the merits of the cause. Id. at 534, 527 N.E.2d at
1011.

132. Id. at 541, 527 N.E.2d at 1016. The court rejected defendant's argument that a
showing of actual malice was required to proceed on an emotional distress theory. Id. at
531-33, 527 N.E.2d at 1009-11. The court cited Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) for the proposition that actual malice is required only for public figures.
133. 176 I11.
App. 3d 886, 531 N.E.2d 941 (1st Dist. 1988).
134. Id. at 894, 531 N.E.2d at 946.
135. Id. at 889, 531 N.E.2d at 943.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 890, 531 N.E.2d at 944. The professor died, so the action proceeded
against the law school. Id. at 889, 531 N.E.2d at 943.
138. Id. at 891, 531 N.E.2d at 944-45.
139. Id. at 892, 531 N.E.2d at 945. The court rejected plaintiff's argument for a
contract or breach of confidence cause of action. Id. at 892-93, 531 N.E.2d at 945-46.
140. Id. at 894, 531 N.E.2d at 946 (citing Melvin v. Burling, 141 Il. App. 3d 786, 490
N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986)).
141.

Id. at 895, 531 N.E.2d at 947. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
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VII.

A.

STATUTORY LIABILITY

Structural Work Act

During the Survey period, the Illinois appellate courts repeatedly
interpreted the Structural Work Act (the "Act"). 42 The majority
of cases, discussed below, attempted to define the statutory term
"structure." Other cases under the Act dealt with control over the
work, causation and damages.
1. What is a "Structure" or "Mechanical Device?"
In Hughes v. Taylor Electric Co., 43 the Appellate Court for the
First District ruled that a tunnel' 44 was a structure within the Act's
meaning and that completing it was a protected activity. 145 The
plaintiff was an electrician working on the project. 46 Unable to
find a ladder, he encountered difficulty reaching an elevated electrical switch. While stretching to reach the de-energized switch, his
wrench slipped and touched a live switch, and plaintiff dropped to
the floor to free himself from the current.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants' failure to provide
1 47
adequate equipment violated the Act and constituted negligence.

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that failing to provide a ladder was not a proximate
48
1
cause of plaintiff's injury.

Defendants asserted on appeal that plaintiff was not working on
a "structure" at the time of the accident.149 They argued that
plaintiff merely was connecting an electrical cable to a tunnel-boring machine.' 0 The court stated that the excavation of a tunnel is
indisputably the construction of a "structure" within the Act's
meaning.' The court reasoned that the hookup of a cement pump
dismissal but reversed the judgment against plaintiff for sanctions. Id. at 897, 531 N.E.2d
at 948.
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1987). The Structural Work Act provides a
remedy to persons injured while working upon the erection, repairing, alteration, removal, or painting of structures of many types and characters.
143. 184 I11.App. 3d 454, 540 N.E.2d 408 (1st Dist. 1989).
144. The tunnel was part of the so-called "Deep Tunnel" project designed to alleviate
flooding in the northern part of Chicago and several collar counties.
145. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 540 N.E.2d at 410.
146. Id. at 455, 540 N.E.2d at 409.
147. Id. at 456, 540 N.E.2d at 410.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 456-57, 540 N.E.2d at 410 (citing Simmons v. Union Elec. Co., 121 Il1.
App. 3d 743, 460 N.E.2d 28 (5th Dist.), aff'd, 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946 (1984)).
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was essential to the completion of the tunnel.1 52 Such an activity
pertained to and significantly furthered an ultrahazardous activity

53
in connection with a structure.
In Wellston v. Levy Organization, 54 six vertically-stacked, un-

secured metal fire doors fell onto plaintiff and seriously injured
"'
him. 55
The appellate court considered whether the Act included
the partially-completed floor upon which plaintiff stood at the time
of the accident, as a "structure."'15 6 Because the partially-completed floor was used as a floor or pathway, the court refused to
consider it a "structure" under the Act.
The court further concluded, however, that the Act did apply to
a failure to provide a stay or support for falling objects. The Act,
therefore, covered the fire doors at issue in the case. 57 The court
rejected defendant's additional argument that the Act did not
cover the injured plaintiff because he was not using or moving the
materials that fell upon him. 58 According to the court, merely
walking past a support that is inadequate for its load is a highly
dangerous construction activity covered by the Act. 59 The appellate court thus reversed summary judgment and remanded the case
for trial. 160

In another case, a front-end loader was held to be a "mechanical
contrivance" within the Act's protection even though it supported
152. Id. at 457, 540 N.E.2d at 411.
153. Id. The court stated that whether the plaintiff's ultrahazardous structural activity proximately caused his injuries was a jury question. The court thus reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case. Id. at 458, 540 N.E.2d at 411.
154. 175 Ill. App. 3d 301, 530 N.E.2d 60 (2nd Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 124 In.2d
563, 535 N.E.2d 922 (1989).
155. Id. at 303, 530 N.E.2d at 61-62. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in defendants' favor. Id. at 303, 530 N.E.2d at 61.
156. Id. at 304, 530 N.E.2d at 62. During the Survey period, courts continued to
exclude from the Act's coverage structures or supports used merely as floors or pathways.
See e.g., Gannon v. Commonwealth Edison, 182 Ill.
App. 3d 228, 233-34, 537 N.E.2d
994, 998 (1st Dist. 1989) (slippery surface a completed floor, not a support).
157. 175 Ill. App. 3d at 305-08, 530 N.E.2d at 62-65. The court rejected the reasoning of Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 414 N.E.2d 147 (1st
Dist. 1981), a case that limited the categories of persons protected to those actually supported. The court refused to "judicially erase" terms the legislature included within the
Act. Further, Wellston distinguished Delgatto v. Brandon Assocs., 131 111. 2d 183, 545
N.E.2d 689 (1989), in which the court dealt only tangentially with whether devices
designed to support tools and materials are covered by the Act. In Delgatto, the court
held that when falling duct work injured plaintiffs, which they themselves had stood on
end, the defendant had no duty to provide a stay or support for the duct work. Id. at 194,
545 N.E.2d at 694.
158. 175 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09, 530 N.E.2d at 65.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 309, 530 N.E.2d at 66.
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materials, not persons, at the time of the accident.' 6 ' Plaintiff,
working as an employee on defendant's storm sewer project, was
struck by a front-end loader used to move a pipe. 62 Defendant
asserted that the loader that caused the injury was not a device
within the Act's contemplation.163 The trial court agreed and
granted summary judgment for defendants." 6
The appellate court rejected a narrow interpretation of the Act
65
that would limit its application to supports for workers only.1
Instead, the court held that the Act was intended to prevent inju66
ries caused by unsafe support devices for workers or materials.
The court reasoned that the device's identity alone cannot determine whether the Act covers it. 167 Rather, the use and function of
the device, in the circumstances shown, is decisive. 68 The Act
covered this loader because it was being used
as a support for con69
struction materials at the time of injury.
These cases do not suggest that the Act covers every type of
structure. In Burks v. Matrix Vision of Wilmette, Inc. , the court
rejected plaintiff's argument that for the Act's purposes a system
of cables and poles should be considered a structure because such
systems are large, permanent in nature,
and involve overhead erec7
tion and suspension of materials.' 1
161. Lafata v. Village of Lisle, 185 Ill. App. 3d 203, 541 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1989).
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling that the loader was not a mechanical contrivance
within the Act's meaning. Id. at 204, 541 N.E.2d at 210.
162. Id. at 204-05, 541 N.E.2d at 211.
163. Id. at 206, 541 N.E.2d at 212.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 206-07, 541 N.E.2d at 212. The court rejected Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 414 N.E.2d 147 (1st Dist. 1980), and Carlson v.
Moline Bd. of Educ., 124 Ill. App. 3d 967, 464 N.E.2d 1239 (3d Dist. 1984), which held
that mechanical devices generally refer to contrivances on which a worker is dependent
for support. This interpretation seems flawed. "Failure" is not really needed because a
plaintiff could slip on a wet scaffold, or defendant could fail to provide any support at all.
166. 185 Ill. App. 3d at 207, 541 N.E.2d at 212. See also Prange v. Kamar Constr.
Corp., 109 Ill. App. 3d 1125, 441 N.E.2d 889 (4th Dist. 1982) (Act applied to a forklift
supporting materials at the time materials fell on plaintiff); Rayfield v. Homart Dev. Co.,
100 Ill. App. 3d 620, 427 N.E.2d 193 (1st Dist. 1981) (tractor with a front-bucket used to
lift materials is a mechanical contrivance within the Act's purview).
167. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 207, 541 N.E.2d at 213.
168. Id. (citing Urman v. Walter, 101 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 428 N.E.2d 1051 (1st Dist.
1981)).
169. Id.
170. 174 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 529 N.E.2d 642 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 123 Ill. 2d 556,
535 N.E.2d 399 (1988).
171. Id. at 1088, 529 N.E.2d at 643.
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Additionally, in Heil v. Superior Oil Co. ,172 plaintiff was a derrick hand who unloaded surface oil pipes from a flatbed trailer by
rolling them down boards placed up to the bed of the truck.' 7 3 A
board broke and a pipe fell on and injured plaintiff. The trial court
granted defendnat's motion for summary judgment, ruling that
there was no protected structure or structural activity. 174 Affirming, the appellate court stated that an oil well is not a "structure" because it is a single hole in the ground, not an
interconnected system of pipes. 175 Therefore,
the Act does not pro76
tect the task of unloading oil well pipes. 1
2.

Who is in Charge of the Work?

The Act applies to any owner, contractor, subcontractor, or
other person "having charge of" the work. A court must find 177
a
liability.
impose
can
it
before
work
the
with
direct connection
The third distrcit's Egizio v. Majetich 178 decision is significant because the court determined that public policy argued against placing liability on homeowners who contract for home improvements.
In Egizio, a part-time handyman fell from a ladder while helping
defendants remodel a house. 1 79 Plaintiff had been hired under an
oral contract which allowed him to set his own time, keep track of
his own hours, and determine for himself the manner in which he
would perform any task. 80 The court looked to the totality of circumstances to determine if the homeowners were in charge of the
work.'"' The court found that plaintiff actually directed all the
remodelling activity and that the homeowners only acted as "gophers."'81 2 Defendants never exercised any authority to halt the
172. 182 111. App. 3d 238, 242, 537 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 127
Ill. 2d 616, 545 N.E.2d 110 (1989).
173. Id. at 239-40, 537 N.E.2d at 1046. Surface oil pipes act as a liner for the top
portion of an oil well hole. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 1047.
174. Id. at 240, 537 N.E.2d at 1046.
175. Id. at 241-42, 537 N.E.2d at 1047-48 (citing Bishop v. Mitchell Group, Inc., 163
Ill. App. 3d 275, 516 N.E.2d 969 (5th Dist. 1987)).
176. Id. at 242, 537 N.E.2d at 1048.
177. See Gannon v. Chicago M.S.P. & P. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
178. 172 Ill. App. 3d 758, 527 N.E.2d 13 (3d Dist. 1988).
179. Id. at 759-760, 527 N.E.2d at 14.
180. Id. at 760, 527 N.E.2d at 14. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant. Id. at 761, 527 N.E.2d at 15.
181. Id. at 761, 527 N.E.2d at 15. The court found the following factors relevant:
the right to supervise, degree of participation, responsibility for safety precautions, right
to stop the work, ownership of equipment, familiarity with construction custom and
practice, and ability to alleviate improper habits or equipment deficiencies. Id.
182. Id. at 762, 527 N.E.2d at 15.
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3.

Causation and Damages

To recover under the Act, the injury or death sustained must
have been caused by the defendant's wilful violation of, or failure
to adhere to, the Act. Consequently, an injury unrelated to the
condition or placement of a support does not come within its
purview.
In Overbeck v. Jon Construction,8 4 the appellate court held that
because an electrical explosion caused plaintiff's injuries, the Act
did not apply.' 8 5 In Overbeck, plaintiff was seriously injured when
he could not prevent a "fish tape"'' 8 6 from contacting an electrically live conductor in an electrical panel. 8 7 The resultant explosion knocked plaintiff off his ladder. The ladder, however, did not
fall. Consequently, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment.'
The appellate court noted that the ladder upon which plaintiff
stood was not defective.' 9 According to the court, placement
makes a ladder defective only when the placement creates one of
the hazards protected by the Act, such as falling.' 9° The real hazard that caused the explosion was negligent pushing of fish tape.' 9'
The placement of the ladder, which required plaintiff to squeeze
through a doorway, just reduced the time he had to catch the fish
tape. 19 2 Accordingly, the court held that such an electrocution and
explosion were not protected. 193
In Pickett v. Yellow Cab, 1 decedent died as a result of injuries
183. Id.
184. 184 Ill. App. 3d 918, 540 N.E.2d 969 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 621,
545 N.E.2d 115 (1989).
185. Id. at 925, 540 N.E.2d at 973. During the Survey period a similar case afforded
no protection under the Act in which decedent was electrocuted when a piece of siding he
was installing came in contact with overhead wires. Barrera v. Windy City Exteriors, 182
Ill. App. 3d 936, 538 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 611, 545 N.E.2d
104 (1989).
186. "Fish tape" is a flexible metal tape used to guide wires through an electrical
conduit.
187. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 540 N.E.2d at 971.
188. Id. at 920, 540 N.E.2d at 970.
189. Id. at 923, 540 N.E.2d at 972.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 924, 540 N.E.2d at 972.
192. Id. at 923, 540 N.E.2d at 972.
193. Id. at 925, 540 N.E.2d at 973.
194. 182 Ill. App. 3d 62, 537 N.E.2d 933 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 640,
545 N.E.2d 129 (1989).
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he sustained when he fell from a scaffold. 19 The trial court dismissed the part of the complaint seeking loss of society.1 96 The
appellate court held that because courts routinely allow loss of society damages under the Wrongful Death Act, they 97should also
allow such damages under the Structural Work Act.
For several decades after its passage in 1907, courts rarerly interpreted the Structural Work Act. Cases decided during the Survey year demonstrate the increased use of the Act to compensate
injured workers engaged in hazardous activities, beyond the benefits provided by Workmen's Compensation.
B.

The Dram Shop Act

The Dram Shop Act (the "Act") provides plaintiffs, injured in
alcohol-related torts, a limited cause of action against liquor sellers. 198 During the Survey period, an appellate court decided a
unique case that tested the limits of the statute's applicability.
In Engel v. Lamplighter, 99 plaintiffs filed a complaint against
three tavern owners because they allegedly served alcohol to an
individual who later shot and killed a woman on the front porch of
plaintiffs' home, while plaintiffs watched."co Plaintiffs complained
that they later sustained permanent physical and mental illness as a
result of witnessing the shooting.2°" On defendant's motion, the
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 2
Plaintiffs argued on appeal that recoveries under the Act should
include injuries to the person for mental distress similar to common law tort theory.20 3 Plaintiffs reasoned that because tort law
once disallowed such recovery but now allows it, judicial interpretations of the Act should follow suit.2° The court rejected the proposed change in the law as contrary to precedent. The court
explained that the Act exclusively defines the remedies available;
195. Id. at 63, 537 N.E.2d at 934.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 68-69, 537 N.E.2d at 937.
198. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 43, paras. 93.9 -194 (1987).
199. 172 Ill. App. 3d 59, 526 N.E.2d 641 (3d Dist. 1988).
200. Id. at 60, 526 N.E.2d at 642.
201. Id. The individual who shot the victim committed suicide and left no appreciable estate against which to proceed. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 61, 526 N.E.2d at 643.
204. Id. (citing Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983)
on the negligence "zone-of-physical-danger-rule" and Knierim v. Izzo, 22 I11.2d 73, 174
N.E.2d 157 (1961) on intentional infliction of severe emotional distress). For further
discussion of Knierim, see supra text accompanying note 117.
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therefore, plaintiffs' attempt to inject tort theories of recovery was
misguided. 20 Because the Act provided for plaintiff's sole remedy
against the tavern operators, mental distress damages were not
recoverable.2 0e
VIII.

CONTRIBUTION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Third District decided a case involving the interplay between the
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act 20 7 and the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. 208
In Lietsch v. Allen, 2° the court opposed the trend that precludes an
immunity defense to contribution claim.2 10
The Lietsch plaintiff, a police officer, was directing traffic when
she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by defendant Allen . 2 1 Another police officer allegedly had directed Allen to drive
the wrong way.21 2 Plaintiff originally sued Allen for negligence.
Allen impleaded the City of Galesburg seeking contribution on the
basis that the city failed to provide proper safety clothing for its
officers and that it failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles approaching from the left. 2 3 Galesburg claimed immunity from suit
under the Tort Immunity Act. 214 The trial court struck Galesburg's defense.21 5
On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court considered whether
205. 172 Ill. App. 3d at 61-62, 526 N.E.2d at 643. Moreover, in Knierim, 22 Ill. 2d at
78-79, 174 N.E.2d at 160-61, the court stated that mental distress does not constitute an
injury under the Dram Shop Act.
206. 172 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 526 N.E.2d at 643.
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-05 (1987). The Act provides that, whenever
two or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person
or property, there is a right of contribution among them.
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101 - 10-101 (1987). The Act protects local
public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of
government.
209. 173 Ill. App. 3d 516, 527 N.E.2d 978 (3d Dist.), appeal denied, 123 Ill. 2d 559,
535 N.E.2d 403 (1988). During the Survey period, only one other court dealt with contribution in a novel way. The fourth district held that an underlying duty is required to
maintain a contribution action. The absence of an electric company's duty to cut bushes
that obstructed a driver's view in a railroad crossing accident precluded the railroad from
recovering contribution from that company. Coen v. Illinois C.G.R.R., 180 Ill. App. 3d
614, 536 N.E.2d 215 (4th Dist. 1989).
210. See Zaremski and Cottrell, Risk Shifting Defenses and Third-PartyPractice.: The
Impact of Skinner and Alvis, 14 Loy. CHI. L.J. 467, 492 (1983).
211. 173 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 527 N.E.2d at 979.
212. Id. at 517-18, 527 N.E.2d at 979.
213. Id. at 518, 527 N.E.2d at 979.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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a municipality is precluded from asserting the immunities permitted under the Tort Immunity Act in an action brought under the
Contribution Act.216 The appellate court began its analysis by stating that the Tort Immunity Act derogates the common law and
must be construed strictly.21 The court noted that traditional governmental immunity applies to a city's discretionary activity.2"
Wilful and wanton misconduct, however, is not immune. The
court disagreed with Allen's contention that the Contribution Act
superseded the Tort Immunity Act. 2 19 The court reasoned that the

Contribution Act was intended to impose liability only upon those
who are otherwise subject to liability in tort.2 20

Because Allen

failed to allege that city employees engaged in wilful or wanton
conduct in the execution or enforcement of the law, the claim for
contribution was barred.
Lietsch is a noteworthy exception to the policy of placing the
loss on the party who caused it, in derogation of traditional immunities. The court refused to hold the City liable to Allen, the third
party defendant, on a broader basis than it could be liable to Officer Lietsch, the injured plaintiff. The court thus avoided reaching
what it deemed a "nonsensical" result.221 In so doing, however,
the court flew in the face of public policy favoring broad application of the Contribution Act.
IX.

EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS

Exculpatory agreements exempt a. party from liability for his
own negligence. Illinois courts, as well as those of other states,
traditionally do not favor such agreements, particularly if they
contravene public policy or if they are between parties of uneven
bargaining power. During the Survey period, however, courts upheld several exculpatory agreements.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Rio v. Edward Hosp., 104 Ill. 2d 354, 472 N.E.2d 421 (1984) and
Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 Ill. 2d 339, 270 N.E.2d 415 (1971)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 520, 527 N.E.2d at 980.
220. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (1985)).
221. Id. at 520, 527 N.E.2d at 980. Justice Scott wrote a vigorous dissent in which he
stated that if the Illinois Supreme Court had considered the issue, it would have decided
the case differently. He pointed out that in Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 461 N.E.2d
382, 386 (1984), the supreme court indicated that Contribution Act intended to reach
anyone who is culpable, regardless of whether they have been immunized from direct
action in tort. In Stephens v. McBride, 97 Ill. 2d 515, 455 N.E.2d 54 (1983), the court
indicated a preference for the policies underlying the Contribution Act by holding the
notice provisions in the Tort Immunity Act inapplicable to a defendant seeking contribution from a governmental entity covered by the Act.
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For example, in Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center,222 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District upheld an exculpatory agreement for negligence with respect to parachute jumping.2 23 The court indicated that exculpatory contracts should be
enforced unless public policy or the social relationship of the parties militate against upholding the agreement. 224 The court stated
that exculpatory agreements may be upheld when a perilous activity like parachute jumping is involved, provided that the agreement
clearly sets forth the activities to which it applies. 225 The court
concluded, as a matter of law, that some risk of death attends parachute jumping and that plaintiff's decedent, a former Army Air
Corps officer and pilot, was aware of this risk. 226 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the exculpatory agreement's scope covered the
22 7
type of accident decedent suffered.

Nevertheless, the court agreed with plaintiff that the exculpatory
clause, as it applied to the wilful and wanton counts, was void as
against public policy. 228 To the extent that the clauses in the agree-

ment could be construed to protect defendants from liability for
229
wilful and wanton acts, the clauses would not be given effect.
Consequently, the court reversed summary judgment as to the willful and wanton counts of plaintiff's complaint.23 °
In Moran v. Lala,23 ' the second district upheld an exculpatory
clause in an agreement for the rental of combat game paint pellet
guns.2 32 While standing in a "free zone" where no shots were to be
222. 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 533 N.E.2d 941 (2d Dist. 1989).
223. Id. at 603-04, 533 N.E.2d at 945-46. Plaintiff's decedent fell to his death because the parachute provided by defendants became entangled. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death and survival under both negligence and wilful and wanton tort theories.
Defendant moved for summary judgment because of an exculpatory agreement entered
into by the decedent and defendant. The circuit court granted defendant's motion, ruling
that the agreement barred recovery. Id. at 599-600, 533 N.E.2d at 942-43.
224. Id. at 602, 533 N.E.2d at 944 (citing Harris v. Walker, 119 Il1. 2d 542, 519
N.E.2d 917 (1988); Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 413 N.E.2d 1252 (1980); and
Calarco v. YMCA, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 501 N.E.2d 268 (2d Dist. 1986), appealdenied,
114 Il1. 2d 543, 508 N.E.2d 725 (1987)).
225. Id. at 602, 533 N.E.2d at 944-45 (citing Randle v. Hinckley Parachute Center,
141 Ill. App. 3d 660, 490 N.E.2d 1041 (2d Dist. 1986) and Poskozium v. Monnacep, 131
Ill. App. 3d 446, 475 N.E.2d 1042 (1st Dist. 1985)).
226. Id. at 602, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
227. Id. at 603, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
228. Id. at 604, 533 N.E.2d at 946.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 605, 533 N.E.2d at 946.
231. 179 Ill. App. 3d 771, 534 N.E.2d 1319 (2d Dist. 1989).
232. Id. at 785, 534 N.E.2d at 1329.
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fired, plaintiff was injured by a shot in the eye.2 33 Plaintiff, however, was not wearing safety goggles at the time.234 The court
quickly disposed of plaintiff's challenge to the agreement. The
court said that exculpatory clauses will be upheld in the absence of
any statute voiding them. 235 Having found no applicable statutory
exception, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when
weapons were possessed in the "free zone. "236
A similar analysis was used to uphold an agreement related to a
racetrack accident. In Koch v. Spalding,237 the court upheld the
agreement because no fraudulent inducement or execution was
shown. Further, plaintiff knew the risks, had signed such agreements before, and had ample opportunity to read the document. 23
Although these cases break no new ground, they are noteworthy
because they demonstrate that courts will approve exculpatory
agreements for ultrahazardous activities when the plaintiff assumed the risk.
X.

DAMAGES

A. Discount to Present Value Limited
During the Survey period, the courts' definition of adequate
damages varied as widely as their cases. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District held a $15 million verdict not excessive
because plaintiff suffered permanent, disabling injuries. 239 The
same court, however, held a $26,077 verdict adequate because
plaintiff's complaints of pain were subjective and because evidence
showed that plaintiff was not disabled and had not suffered func24°
tional loss.
Of particular significance was the supreme court's ruling in a
case arising out of a bicycle accident. In Schaffner v. Chicago &
North Western Transportation,24 ' the court held that damages for
pain, suffering, disability and disfigurement should not be dis233. Id. at 773, 534 N.E.2d at 1321.
234. Id. at 774, 534 N.E.2d at 1322.
235. Id. at 786, 534 N.E.2d at 1329.
236. Id. at 786-87, 534 N.E.2d at 1329.
237. 174 Ill. App. 3d 692, 529 N.E.2d 19 (5th Dist. 1988).
238. Id. at 697, 529 N.E.2d at 22-23.
239. Richter v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 177 Ill.
App. 3d 247, 532 N.E.2d 269
(1st Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 125 Ill.
2d 574, 537 N.E.2d 818 (1989).
240. Rozner v. Chicago Transit Auth., 183 Ill.
App. 3d 613, 539 N.E.2d 270 (lst
Dist. 1989).
241. 129 111. 2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643 (1989).
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counted to present value.242 Daniel Schaffner was injured severely
when the wheel disengaged from the front fork of his bicycle, while
he was riding over defendant's railroad crossing.243 On appeal, defendants attacked the trial judge's exclusion of argument that
would have invited the jury to make an additional reduction in
damages, already reduced to present cash value. The trial judge
had prevented defense counsel from arguing that any sum of damages awarded to plaintiff could be invested to produce a stream of
income. 2 4
Under Illinois law, future damages for medical expenses and lost
earnings are to be discounted to present cash value but damages for
pain and suffering, disability and disfigurement are not.24 5 The
supreme court considered the trial court's order which precluded
any argument suggesting to the jury it should consider income obtained by investment of the future damages sum, computed by
plaintiff's expert.246 Fearing an unwarranted, additional reduction,
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's limitation on
the scope of argument.247
Schaffner is an important case because it suggests that juries
may not reduce sums already calculated in present cash value by
plaintiff's expert 248 or improperly reduce sums to which the present cash value rule does not apply, such as damages for pain and
suffering.249
B. Loss of Instruction and Training
In recent wrongful death cases courts have tended to uphold
jury awards of pecuniary damages for a child's loss of training and
instruction as a result of a parent's death. In Stringham v. United
ParcelService,25° plaintiff's father was killed when he collided with
the rear of defendant's parked semi-trailer.2 5 1 Defendant appealed
242. Id. at 24-25, 541 N.E.2d at 652-53.
243. Id. at 8, 541 N.E.2d at 645.
244. Id. at 24, 541 N.E.2d at 652. The judge granted plaintiff's motion and also
limited closing argument.
245. Id. at 24-25, 541 N.E.2d at 652-53. See Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill. 2d
164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77,
55 N.E.2d 57, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753 (1944); and Howard v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 13
Ill. App. 2d 482, 142 N.E.2d 825 (4th Dist. 1957).
246. 129 Ill. 2d at 25, 541 N.E.2d at 653.
247. Id. at 24-26, 541 N.E.2d at 652-53.
248. Id. at 25-26, 541 N.E.2d at 653.
249. Id.
250. 181 Ill. App. 3d 312, 536 N.E.2d 1292 (2d. Dist.), appeal denied, 541 N.E.2d
1115 (1989).
251. Id. at 314, 536 N.E.2d at 1293.
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from a jury verdict for plaintiff, contesting the validity of an award
for the child's loss of instruction and training.252
Noting the recent trend in recent Illinois Supreme Court cases to
expand the scope of pecuniary injury to encompass nonmonetary
losses in wrongful death cases, the appellate court reasoned that
the jury's award of pecuniary damages for the child's loss of training and instruction was appropriate. 3 The court found a limited
inquiry into plaintiff's Down's Syndrome relevant because it provided a context for evaluating the loss of the decedent's guidance,
attention, and instruction to his daughter.254
Although Stringham follows a trend, it notably declined to follow the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District's decision in
American National Bank and Trust v. Thompson,255 in which the
court held that the effects of inflation on damages for future earnings is inadmissible in Illinois. Stringham held that predicting future earnings damages without considering inflation results in
unrealistically low estimates of those earnings.256 The impact of
Stringham may be higher damages awards in cases today.
C. Punitive Damages
Illinois allows punitive damages for conduct that is "committed
with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or
when the defendant acts willingly, or with such gross negligence as
to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. ' 257 Punitive
damages have been escalating at an alarming rate and, as a result,
are under attack.2 58 Despite the general trend, two Illinois decisions during the Survey period upheld punitive damamge awards.
In Deal v. Byford,259 an apartment building employee attacked
plaintiff.26 The trial court entered an award of $1,275 compensatory damages plus $25,000 for punitive damages. 261 The appellate
court affirmed. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court cautioned
that courts must assure punitive damages are not improperly or
252. Id.
253. Id. at 315, 536 N.E.2d at 1294 (citing Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill.
2d 505, 468
N.E.2d 1228 (1984)).
254. Id. at 316, 536 N.E.2d at 1294.
255. 158 Il1. App. 3d 478, 511 N.E.2d 1206 (1st Dist. 1987).
256. 181 I11.
App. 3d at 318, 536 N.E.2d at 1297.
257. Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 IlL. 2d 172, 186, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978).
258. See J. GHIARDHI AND J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 3 (1984) (for a discussion of some arguments against punitive damage awards).
259. 127 Ill. 2d 192, 537 N.E.2d 267 (1989).
260. Id.at 195, 537 N.E.2d at 268.
261. Id. at 196, 537 N.E.2d at 268.
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unjustly awarded.2 62 Nevertheless, the court stated that it would
not disturb a punitive damages award, unless it was clearly the result of passion, impartiality, or corruption. 263 The supreme court
concluded that the unprovoked attack on plaintiff in her apartment
was sufficiently abusive; therefore, it affirmed the jury's verdict.2'
In Loitz v. Remington Arms Co. ,26- plaintiff was injured by an
exploding shotgun. The appellate court held a punitive damages
award of $1,600,000 not excessive in light of the manufacturer's
flagrant indifference to public safety.266 This case is significant because it endorsed an often-cited multiple factor test for determining "flagrant indifference,

' 26

and it rejected defendant's challenge

to punitive damages on constitutional grounds.268
XI.

LEGISLATION

During the Survey period two major developments affected statutory tort law. First, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the sec269
tion of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (the "Act")
granting special immunity to the Chicago Transit Authority (the
"CTA")27 ° from tort liability for any failure to protect passengers
from the criminal acts of third parties.2 71 The court rejected plaintiff's various constitutional attacks on the statute. Plaintiff
charged the CTA with negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct in connection with a bus driver's refusal to stop his bus and
protect plaintiff from a severe beating by drunk and disruptive pas262. Id. at 203, 537 N.E.2d at 272.
263. Id. at 204, 537 N.E.2d at 272.
264. Id. at 204, 206, 537 N.E.2d at 272-73. That the punitive damages amount was
far out of proportion to the compensatory was held irrelevant. Id. at 204, 537 N.E.2d at
272.
265. 177 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 532 N.E.2d 1091 (4th Dist. 1988), appealallowed, 126 Ill.
2d 560, 541 N.E.2d 1107 (1989).
266. Id. at 1058, 532 N.E.2d at 1106.
267. Id. at 1058, 532 N.E.2d at 1105. For a complete discussion of the factors used,
see Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257
(1976).
268. Id. at 1059, 532 N.E.2d at 1106. A landmark case in this area is Juzwin v.
Amtrog Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989), in which a federal court held
that substantive due process barred recovery of punitive damages because plaintiff previously had been assessed punitive damages in a case arising out of the same cause of
action.
269. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 327 (1987). The supreme court's decision is also
discussed in Troy and Fehringer, State and Local Government, 21 Loy. CHI. L.J. 601
(1990).
270. The CTA is the major mass transportation system in Chicago.
271. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 125 Ill. 2d 230, 531 N.E.2d 1 (1988).
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2 72 The CTA responded that it was immune under the
sengers.
3

Act.

27

The supreme court identified the controlling issue, in the special
legislation and equal protection challenges, as whether the statute
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.2 74 Only if a
statute is enacted for reasons totally unrelated to a legitimate state
goal will the court invalidate it as special legislation and a violation
of equal protection.275 Plaintiff alleged that the Act arbitrarily classified public carriers differently from private carriers and that there
was no rational basis for placing defendant in a better position than
privately-owned carers.276
The supreme court ruled that the Act withstood plaintiff's attack because taxpayers' substantial involvement in the funding of
public transportation provided a rational basis for differentiating
between public and private carriers for failure to prevent thirdparty criminal actions.277 That the Act provided the CTA with
broader immunity than other municipal entities did not violate
equal protection or special legislation rules because the CTA was
created to provide transportation to the public at large, rather than
to guarantee the safety of individuals.278
Finally, the court held that immunity did not violate the certain
remedy provision of the Illinois Constitution 279 because the Act
simply restricted the class of potential defendants from whom injured passengers could recover; it did not deprive the injured passenger of a remedy.28° In short, the court ruled that the Act
"insures that CTA funds are spent on public transportation services and are not diverted to satisfy private damage claims" by pas272. 125 Ill. 2d at 234, 531 N.E.2d at 2.
273. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and held that
the Act violated the Illinois Constitution's guarantee of a remedy for all injuries and
wrongs, ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12, and the prohibition against special legislation, ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 13. 125 Ill. 2d at 234, 531 N.E.2d at 2. The prohibition against special
legislation prevents the legislature from conferring a special benefit or privilege to a person or class to the exclusion of those similarly situated. The trial court also held that the
statute violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States (U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV) and Illinois Constitutions (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2). 125 Ill. 2d at 234, 531 N.E.2d
at 2.
274. 125 Ill. 2d at 236, 531 N.E.2d at 3.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 236-37, 531 N.E.2d at 3.
277. Id. at 238, 531 N.E.2d at 4.
278. Id. at 242-43, 531 N.E.2d at 6.
279. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides in part that every person shall find by law
"certain remedy" for injuries suffered "freely, completely, and promptly."
280. Id. at 245-47, 531 N.E.2d at 7-8.
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senger-victims.a
The second major legislative development during the Survey
year affecting tort law was the passage of the Sexual Exploitation
by Psychotherapists Act.28 2 This Act recognizes the widespread
problem of psychotherapists' sexual exploitation of patients during
or even after a course of treatment.283 Recognizing that such conduct is a clear violation of the physician's duty of care owed a patient, the legislature created a cause of action allowing a patient or
former patient to recover for the sexual advances of a psychotherapist.2 4 The Act creates a private right of action for injury caused
by sexual contact or the mere request for it. 2 5 The patient may
also recover damages if the sexual contact resulted from "therapeutic deception"; that is, if the therapist used knowledge about
the patient to lure him or her into sexual relations. Furthermore,
consent is no defense. 2 6 Finally, the Act carries with it a two-year
statute of limitations.287
281. Id. at 238, 531 N.E.2d at 4. In a case involving the statute of limitations under
the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, Medina v. Taylor, 185 Ill. App. 3d 808, 542
N.E.2d 33 (1st Dist. 1989), the appellate court held that the one-year statute of limitations for actions against the CTA, and not the two-year limitation for personal injuries,
applied to a negligence action against a bus driver who struck plaintiff's vehicle from
behind. Id. at 810-11, 542 N.E.2d at 34.
282. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
283. Two well-known authors in the field of human sexuality have written that during the natural course of therapy, the patient transfers feelings to the therapist; therefore,
betrayal of this transference is tantamount to rape. Masters and Johnson, Principles of
the New Sex Therapy, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 548, 553 (1976). In Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill.
App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13 (2d Dist. 1985), the court upheld a man's cause of action
against a social worker who had sexual relations with the man's wife during the course of
marriage counseling. The court stated that the mishandling of the transference phenomenon constituted a breach of the therapist's duty to engage only in conduct to improve the
patient's well-being. The court held that such a breach can support an actionable and
independent tort. Id. at 145, 474 N.E.2d at 18. See also Goode, The Ultimate Betrayal,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (March 12, 1990).
Moreover, sex-related charges now rank eighth in the list of causes of malpractice
against psychiatrists. Moisal, Sins of the Secular Priesthood:Civil Liabilityfor the Sexual
Seduction of Patients, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 440, 443 (1987).
284. Id. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.93 (West 1987) (creates cause of action for money
damages against a psychotherapist for sexual contact, if the sexual act occurred within
two years following the termination of therapy) and MINN. STAT. § 148A.01-06 (1986)
(creates a cause of action for sexual exploitation if the psychotherapist engages in sexual
contact with a former patient and the latter is either emotionally dependent on the therapist or the sexual contact occurs by means of therapeutic deception).
285. Id. para. 802.
286. Id.
287. Id. para. 806.
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XII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, Illinois courts confronted significant
tort law issues. For Illinois citizens, perhaps the most siginficant
decision involved the supreme court's refusal to strike down the
Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, thereby immunizing the Chicago Transit Authority from liability for the failure to protect passengers from the criminal acts of third parties. Also this Survey
year, the court opened a new channel to landlord liability for third
party criminal acts. In addition, the courts continued to limit the
scope of recovery for fetal torts, by refusing a wrongful death action on behalf of an aborted fetus, and by ruling that a child may
not recover from its mother for negligent prenatal injuries. Finally, as other jurisdictions take contrasting positions, Illinois
courts may be faced with challenges on these issues in the future.

